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INTRODUCTION

On January 17, 2012, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie signed
into law a resolution that would permit betting on sports at New
1
Jersey casinos and racetracks. This action contravened a federal law,
the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992
(“PASPA”), which presently forbids the states from allowing legal
2
sports betting, with four specific exceptions. Although wagering on
sports is prohibited in 46 states, studies have estimated that as much
as $380 billion changes hands per year in the United States as a result
3
of illegal betting. This number is over one hundred times the
4
amount wagered legally at Nevada sports books in 2011. Because
states like New Jersey desire to turn this illegal activity into taxable
business transactions, PASPA has not existed without controversy. In
2009, Delaware passed a law that would have expanded the types of
sports wagering activity permitted within its borders, and in both
2007 and 2011 private citizens (in the latter case, New Jersey state
5
legislators) sued to have PASPA declared unconstitutional. Presently,
five major athletic organizations have brought suit to enjoin the
implementation of the New Jersey plan to permit sports betting,
claiming that legalized sports betting in New Jersey would threaten
6
the integrity of the athletic contests they oversee. Given that New
1

Wayne Parry, Christie Signs Sports Betting Bill Into Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 17,
2012,
http://www.profootballweekly.com/2012/01/17/christie-signs-nj-sportsbetting-bill-into-law.
2
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704
(1992); see also id. at § 3704 (creating exceptions that specifically apply to the preexisting betting practices in the states of Delaware, Montana, Nevada, and Oregon, as
well as for “pari-mutuel animal racing or jai alai games.” § 3704 also opened a oneyear window in which New Jersey could pass a law qualifying it for an exemption of its
own).
3
NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N REPORT 2-14 (1999) available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/finrpt.html.
4
Sports
Wagering
Fact
Sheet,
AMERICAN
GAMING
ASSOCIATION,
http://www.americangaming.org/industry-resources/research/fact-sheets/sportswagering (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
5
Interactive Media Entm’t and Gaming Ass’n, Inc. v. Holder, Civil Action No.
09-1301, 2011 WL 802106, at *5-6 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011) (discussing OFC Comm
Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2009) and Flagler v. U.S. Attorney for the
Dist. of N. J., Civ. No. 06-3699, 2007 WL 2814657, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2007)).
6
See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. CV124947, 2012 WL 3171566, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 7,
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Jersey’s law violates PASPA on its face, the only viable defense the
state has is to attack the constitutionality of the federal law.
Importantly, none of the previous three suits involving PASPA
7
reached any constitutional arguments. Yet, even if New Jersey’s
constitutional challenge is not viable, there are numerous policy
reasons why a repeal of PASPA should be explored.
Part II of this Note is an overview of the history of the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act and related
litigation, including the ongoing lawsuit involving the state of New
Jersey. Part III walks through the constitutional arguments made in
New Jersey’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and those
arguments made again on appeal— arguments that were adopted in
a dissenting opinion by Judge Vanaskie of the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit. In Part IV, this Note explores a number of policy
arguments against PASPA’s blanket prohibition, as well as a number
of game-fixing and point-shaving scandals that are often cited in
support of banning sports betting. Finally, Part V makes the policy
argument that even if New Jersey’s constitutional challenges lack
merit, PASPA should be revisited in light of this challenge because of
the positive effects a repeal or revision are likely to have on gambling
enforcement, as well as on New Jersey’s economy.
II.

OVERVIEW OF PASPA

A. Legislative History
On February 22, 1991, Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona
introduced S. 474, the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection
Act, which would prohibit sports gambling throughout the United

2012) (complaint on behalf of Major League Baseball, the National Basketball
Association, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, the National Football
League, and the National Hockey League).
7
See generally Interactive Media Entm’t and Gaming Ass’n , 2011 WL 802106
(holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue); OFC Comm Baseball, 579 F.3d 293
(holding that the statute should be construed narrowly to limit Delaware to forms of
gambling precisely as they existed at the time of the passage of PASPA); Flagler, 2007
WL 2814657 (holding that plaintiff lacked standing to sue).
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8

States in locations where it did not already exist. DeConcini asserted
that the activities he sought to ban “threaten[] the integrity and
character of, and public confidence in, professional and amateur
9
sports, and instill[] inappropriate values in our Nation’s youth.” As
the bill passed through committee and moved closer to passage, a
number of legislators spoke out against it, notably Frank Lautenberg
10
of New Jersey. Senator Lautenberg expressed concern that the
format of the bill, creating an exception by which Nevada could
permit sports betting at its casinos, would cause serious harm to the
11
Atlantic City, New Jersey casino industry. Senator Lautenberg’s
criticism was undercut, however, by the passionate support the bill
12
received from his fellow New Jersey senator, Bill Bradley. As a
former professional basketball player, Senator Bradley’s credibility in
13
opposing legalized sports betting was apparently unassailable. As a
champion of PASPA, Bradley seriously damaged any chance New
14
Jersey had of formulating a legitimate narrative of discrimination.
President George H.W. Bush signed PASPA into law on October
15
28, 1992. Thanks to the exceptions contained in § 3703, New Jersey
had the opportunity to pass a law permitting sports betting within
16
one year of the date PASPA became law. As a result of the political
infighting in the state legislature, as well as the lack of support from
17
Senator Bradley, New Jersey did not pass such a law.

8

137 CONG. REC. S2,256-04 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dennis
DeConcini).
9
Id.
10
138 CONG. REC. S7,300-01 (daily ed. June 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Frank
Lautenberg).
11
Id.
12
See generally Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection ActPolicy Concerns Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5 (1992) (arguing
vehemently for the passage of PASPA).
13
Joseph F. Sullivan, Gambling Debate Rages Anew Over Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/20/nyregion/gambling-debate-rages-anewover-sports.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
14
Id.
15
138 CONG. REC. S18,332-01 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1992) (statement of Sen. Dennis
DeConcini).
16
28 U.S.C.A. § 3703 (West 1992).
17
Joseph F. Sullivan, Judges in Trenton Reject Sports Betting Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
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B. Prior Litigation
On August 7, 2006, James Flagler, a private citizen of New Jersey,
filed suit against then-U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and
Chris Christie, then the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey,
th
alleging that PASPA violates the 10 Amendment and is beyond the
18
reach of the Commerce Power. The district court ruled that the
plaintiff did not satisfy constitutional or prudential standing
19
requirements. Specifically, the court found that Mr. Flagler failed to
demonstrate that the federal prohibition on sports wagering activities
represented an “injury-in-fact,” as well as that a favorable disposition
20
on the case would have adequately redressed his perceived injuries.
Thus, although the challenge failed, the district court did not
establish any precedent regarding PASPA’s constitutionality.
On May 14, 2009, Delaware Governor Jack Markell signed a law
that would permit “point spread bets . . . over/under bets . . . and . . .
21
multi-game parlay bets.” Following a request from Governor
Markell, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in an advisory opinion
22
on May 29, 2009, that the legislation did not violate state law. The
same five entities that are plaintiffs in the ongoing New Jersey suit
23
sought an injunction against the Delaware plan. The U.S. District
Court for the District of Delaware denied the injunction and the
leagues were granted an interlocutory appeal to the Third Circuit
24
Court of Appeals. In Markell, the Third Circuit’s analysis focused on
the language of PASPA outlining the exception under which
25
Delaware had qualified. The opinion turns on the interpretation of
a single phrase: “to the extent that the scheme was conducted by that
26
State.” Delaware interpreted this phrase to mean that since it had
18, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/18/nyregion/judges-in-trenton-rejectsports-betting-plan.html?pagewanted=2&src=pm.
18
Flagler, 2007 WL 2814657, at *1.
19
Id., at *2.
20
Id., at *2, *3.
21
Markell, 579 F.3d at 295.
22
Id. at 295-96.
23
Id. at 295.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 300-04.
26
Id. at 301 (emphasis in original).
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conducted some form of sports betting, it remained eligible to
27
conduct any other form of sports betting. The majority sided with
the leagues’ interpretation, that the inclusion of such a phrase within
the statute exhibited Congress’ intent to limit Delaware to precisely
28
the scheme that existed at the time of the passage of PASPA. The
constitutionality of PASPA was never raised by Governor Markell, nor
29
addressed by the court.
On March 7, 2011, New Jersey State Senators Raymond Lesniak
and Stephen Sweeney, in conjunction with three New Jersey
Horsemen’s Associations and iMEGA, a group that publicizes
internet gambling, brought suit against Attorney General Eric Holder
and Paul Fishman, U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey,
30
challenging the constitutionality of PASPA. The plaintiffs alleged
nine counts in which Congress exceeded its constitutionally
31
delegated authority in enacting PASPA. The district court found
that iMEGA and the Horsemen’s Associations did not meet the
injury-in-fact or redressability requirements to have standing in the
32
case. The court also held that Senators Sweeney and Lesniak failed
to satisfy the injury in fact and redressability requirements, as well as
the requirements to achieve “institutional standing” under Coleman v.
33
Miller. Finally, the court concluded that only states— rather than
private individuals— have the requisite standing to make Tenth
34
Amendment challenges.
C. History of the New Jersey Law
On Election Day 2011, New Jersey voters supported by a nearly
two-to-one margin a non-binding referendum that suggested
27
28
29

Markell, 579 F.3d at 301.
Id.
iMEGA v. Holder, No. 09CV01301, 2011 WL 802106, at *5 n.2 (D.N.J. Mar. 7,

2011).
30

Id. at *1.
See generally Complaint and Demand for Declaratory Relief, iMEGA v. Holder,
No. 09CV01301, 2009 WL 4890878, *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2009).
32
iMEGA, 2011 WL 802106, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011).
33
iMEGA, 2011 WL 802106, at *6, *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011) (citing Coleman v.
Miller 307 U.S. 433 (1939)).
34
Id. at *8, *9.
31
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permitting sports betting at Atlantic City casinos, the racetracks at
Monmouth Park, The Meadowlands, Freehold Raceway, the Atlantic
35
City Race Course, and a former track in Cherry Hill. In the face of
such overwhelming support, an amendment to the New Jersey State
Constitution was passed, establishing the constitutionality of a future
36
law permitting sports betting. On November 21, 2011, Senator
Raymond Lesniak introduced a bill in the New Jersey State Senate
“permit[ting] wagering at casinos and racetracks on certain
37
professional and collegiate sports or athletics events.” One week
later, on November 28, Assemblyman John Burzichelli sponsored an
38
identical version of Lesniak’s bill. In the statement accompanying
the initial drafts, legislators established tax rates to be paid by casinos
and racetracks on future sports book income, as well as the
39
conditions that would apply to the state’s newfound tax revenues.
The bulk of tax revenues paid to the state will fund programs for
40
senior citizens and individuals with disabilities. A small percentage
will fund community and economic development projects
throughout the state and a percentage of the registration fee paid by
the casinos and racetracks will fund treatment programs for
41
compulsive gamblers.
The bill went through two revisions in the New Jersey State
Assembly, the more notable of the two eliminating the ability of
patrons to place bets with licensed entities through use of the
42
internet or other electronic devices. The Assembly bill replaced its
Senate counterpart as the final version on January 9, 2012, and
43
passed by a unanimous vote on the same day. On January 17, 2012,

35

Wayne Parry, NJ voters: We want to bet on sports if US says yes, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9QT8KIG0.htm.
36
N.J. Const., Art. IV, § 7, para. 2 (amended Dec. 8, 2011).
37
S. 3113, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2011).
38
A.B. 4385, 214th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2011).
39
A.B. 4385, 214th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. Nov. 28, 2011).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
A.B. 4385, 214th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. Jan. 17, 2012) (omissions from §§
2(d), (e)).
43
Permits Wagering at Casinos and Racetracks on Certain Professional and
Collegiate Sports or Athletic Events, A.B. 4385, 2010-11 Sess. (N.J. 2010), replaced by
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Governor Chris Christie signed the final version of the bill into law,
44
officially defying PASPA. In public statements, Assemblyman
Burzichelli explained that “sports gaming is already taking place, but
the only people taking advantage of it are bookies and criminal
enterprises. This opens the door for New Jersey to implement well45
regulated sports gambling.” In an attempt to aid New Jersey’s efforts
to make legalized sports wagering a reality, Congressmen Frank
Pallone, Jr. and Frank LoBiondo introduced two bills in the U.S.
House of Representatives, one that would exempt New Jersey from
PASPA and another that would grant all states a four year-window—
terminating on January 1, 2016— in which to pass laws legalizing
46
sports betting. Both bills were assigned to committee on January 23,
2012, and as of this writing both have yet to be reported out of
47
committee.
D. Sports Leagues Seek to Enjoin New Jersey Law
On August 7, 2012, the National Basketball Association, the
National Collegiate Athletic Association, the National Football
League, the National Hockey League, and Major League Baseball
48
filed suit to enjoin the implementation of the New Jersey Law. The
plaintiffs allege a single injury, specifically that New Jersey’s law
49
violates PASPA. The leagues base their claim of injury on the
assertion that if wagering on the outcomes of their games is

S.B.
3113
on
Jan.
9,
2012,
available
at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillsByNumber.asp.
44
Wayne Parry, Christie Signs Sports Betting Bill Into Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(January 17, 2012), http://www.profootballweekly.com/2012/01/17/christie-signsnj-sports-betting-bill-into-law.
45
Burzichelli, Wagner & Caputo Bill To Position New Jersey To Implement WellRegulated Sports Gaming Signed Into Law, TARGETED NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 17, 2012
(Lexis).
46
Press Release, Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr., Pallone and LoBiondo Team Up to
Bring Sports Gaming to New Jersey (Apr. 26, 2012) (Lexis).
47
H.R. 3797: Sports Gaming Opportunity Act of 2012, GOVTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3797 (last visited Oct. 23, 2012); H.R.
3809: New Jersey Betting and Equal Treatment Act of 2012, GOVTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3809 (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
48
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Christie, No. CV124947, 2012 WL 3171566, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2012).
49
Id. at ¶ 32.
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permitted “[their] reputation and goodwill will be irreparably
damaged . . . including but not limited to the fact that the
proliferation of sports gambling will adversely affect the way that the
50
public views amateur and professional sports.” The suit seeks
declarations that the law and the as-yet-unwritten regulations violate
federal law, and an injunction preventing the implementation of
51
both.
Days later, on August 10, the plaintiffs moved for summary
judgment and alternatively a preliminary injunction “to preserve the
52
status quo pending a final decision on the merits of their claim.”
The leagues assert that they are entitled to summary judgment
53
because the New Jersey law explicitly violates PASPA. Further, the
leagues assert that PASPA does not violate the Commerce Power, the
Equal Protection Clause, or the Tenth Amendment, and they seek to
54
permanently enjoin New Jersey from implementing its law.
Alternatively, the leagues seek to enjoin implementation of the law to
preserve the status quo until a decision is reached on the merits of
55
the lawsuit.
The state of New Jersey filed its response on September 7, 2012,
56
in the form of a motion to dismiss the suit for lack of standing. The
state asserted that the leagues failed to allege a sufficient “injury-in57
fact” as required by the U.S. Constitution. Further, the state argued
that the claimed injury was not “fairly traceable” to the law in
58
question. New Jersey also contended that Congress, while creating a
50

Id. at ¶ 34.
Id. at ¶ 35.
52
Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and, If
Necessary, to Preserve the Status Quo, a Preliminary Injunction, Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. 12-cv-04947, 2012 WL 3964728, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 10,
2012).
53
Id.
54
See id.
55
Id.
56
Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FED R. CIV. P.
12(b)(1), Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. 3:12-cv-04947, 2012 WL
3964552, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 7, 2012).
57
Id.
58
Id.
51
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private right of action, may not lower the threshold for standing
59
beneath the “floor” that exists pursuant to Article III.
On October 15, 2012, New Jersey published final regulations for
sports betting that permit the New Jersey Division of Gaming
Enforcement to accept license applications and grant licenses as soon
60
as January 9, 2013. U.S. District Judge Michael Shipp heard oral
61
arguments on the standing issue on December 18, 2012.
Judge
Shipp ruled that the leagues do in fact have standing to sue by
meeting all three requirements, and a subsequent round of oral
arguments on dueling motions for summary judgment took place on
62
February 14, 2013. On February 1, 2013, the U.S. Department of
Justice joined the suit and filed a brief in support of the
63
constitutionality of PASPA. On February 28, 2013, Judge Shipp
granted the sports leagues’ motion for summary judgment, declaring
64
that PASPA is in fact constitutional. New Jersey took an expedited
65
appeal to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit affirmed, but one
member of the panel accepted New Jersey’s arguments that PASPA
66
does not legislate evenly amongst the several states.
III.

NEW JERSEY’S CLAIMS THAT PASPA IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

New Jersey’s initial cross-motion for summary judgment
pointedly challenged the standing of the plaintiffs and raised a
59

Id.
Donald Wittkowski, Final regulation approved for sports betting in New Jersey, THE
PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, Oct. 16, 2012 (Lexis).
61
Hoa Nguyen, Lawyers involved in sports betting mandated to appear in Trenton, THE
PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, Oct. 23, 2012 (Lexis).
62
Brent Johnson, U.S. justice department dismisses N.J.’s claim that sports betting ban is
unconstitutional,
THE
STAR-LEDGER,
Feb.
2,
2013,
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/02/us_justice_department_dismisse.ht
ml.
63
Id.
64
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. 12-4947, 2013 WL 772679
(D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2013).
65
Christopher Baxter, Christie administration files notice of appeal in federal sports
betting
case,
THE
STAR-LEDGER
(March
13,
2013),
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/03/christie_administration_files.html.
66
NCAA v. Christie, 730 F.3d 208, 241 (3d Cir. 2013).
60
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67

number of constitutional arguments against PASPA. New Jersey
asserted three arguments: (1) that PASPA violates the Tenth
Amendment, (2) that PASPA exceeds Congress’ Commerce Power,
and (3) that PASPA deprives the 46 states not exempted by PASPA of
68
both due process and equal protection. Judge Shipp denied New
Jersey’s motion, and the Third Circuit affirmed his decision; but since
one of three Third Circuit judges who heard the case agreed with
pieces of New Jersey’s argument for PASPA’s unconstitutionality, and
other states have commenced the process to potentially pass laws
similar to that of New Jersey’s, it is reasonable to presume that the
Supreme Court will address each argument in this case at some point
in the future.
A. Tenth Amendment
The language of the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress
69
from intruding on areas reserved for the states. During the
legislative process that created PASPA, Senator Chuck Grassley voiced
his concerns that PASPA intruded upon an area traditionally reserved
70
to the states. Grassley argued— accurately— that the regulation of
lotteries and casino gaming has traditionally been a state concern,
and asserted that it would be a serious overreach for the federal
71
government to tell the states how they may or may not raise revenue.
Thus far, opponents of PASPA have found it difficult to mount a
challenge on Tenth Amendment grounds because of the difficulties
of establishing standing— the reason why the challenges in both
72
Flagler and iMEGA failed without reaching the merits. In the instant
case, however, the parties challenging PASPA are the defendants,
73
eliminating that procedural hurdle.

67

Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, NCAA v.
Christie, No. 3:12-cv-04947, 2012 WL 6020639, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2012).
68
Id. at II(A-C).
69
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
70
S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 12 (1992).
71
Id.
72
See discussion of Flagler and iMEGA, supra Part I.
73
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. CV124947, 2012 WL 3171566, at
*1 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2012).
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New Jersey argues that the plain language of PASPA violates the
“anti-commandeering” principle protected by the Tenth Amendment
74
and established in New York v. United States. Since New Jersey law
permits sports wagering to be conducted by licensed casinos and
racetracks, PASPA— by virtue of the Supremacy Clause— requires
state officials to implement the federal scheme rather than the laws of
75
New Jersey. Congress does not have the power to direct states to
76
regulate their own citizens. By its terms, PASPA does not outlaw
sports wagering activity, but rather it prevents states from making
77
sports wagering legal. While Congress is permitted to restrict the
78
behavior of a state, New Jersey is not proposing to run any sports
79
betting operations itself. The State even acknowledges that
prohibiting “only State-run or State-sponsored sports betting” would
be consistent with New York v. United States, and suggests an alternate
construction of the statute to limit its prohibition to such State-run
80
schemes.

74

505 U.S. 144 (1992). The essence of the “anti-commandeering principle” is
that if Congress directs state legislatures to act in a certain way, the usual recourse
that exists in the democratic system is taken away from the citizens of the state in
question. For example, if the citizens of New Jersey supported legal sports betting by
a two-to-one majority, but the state legislature disagreed, voters would subsequently
have the opportunity to remove from office those with whom they disagreed and
replace them with pro- sports betting state legislators. Such recourse is unavailable at
the national level. Frank Lautenberg and Robert Menendez are but two of one
hundred members of the Senate, and New Jersey’s twelve Representatives, although
one of the largest delegations in the House, leave 423 seats for which the citizens of
New Jersey do not vote.
75
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-2 (West 2012).
76
New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
77
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 3702 (West 1992) (“It shall be unlawful for a governmental
entity to sponsor, operate . . . betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based . . . on
one or more competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes
participate. . . .”).
78
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).
79
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-2 (West 2012).
80
Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. 3:12-cv-04947, 2012 WL 6020639, at *1,
II(A)(1)(3) (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2012) (hereinafter “Defendants’ Cross-Motion”).
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B. Commerce Clause
The “Applicability” section of PASPA creates a number of very
81
specific exceptions to the blanket prohibition on sports betting. In
fact, these exceptions were expressly contemplated to exempt the
82
four states to which they apply, as well as potentially New Jersey. New
Jersey rests its Commerce Clause arguments on the idea that there
exists a “fundamental principle that all the States enjoy equal
83
sovereignty.” The claim is that PASPA violates this principle because
it does not target a “local evil” and its “disparate geographic coverage
84
is [not] sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.” Prior to
enacting PASPA, congressional findings concluded that “[w]ithout
Federal legislation, sports gambling is likely to spread on a piecemeal
85
basis and ultimately develop an irreversible momentum.” Per New
Jersey’s arguments, this finding tends to demonstrate that Congress
did not consider sports wagering a purely local evil. New Jersey argues
that the kind of “grandfathering” undertaken by PASPA is generally
only permitted to assist with incremental reforms, rather than
86
existing permanently to treat states differently. As a result, the
precedent set by PASPA could be extended by Congress to limit any
form of business or manufacturing to states in which it already takes
87
place. The Supreme Court has apparently abandoned the idea that
there is a uniformity requirement within the Commerce Clause, but
88
has never expressly held as such.

81

28 U.S.C.A. § 3704 (West 1992).
138 Cong. Rec. H11,756-02 (daily Ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. William
Hughes).
83
Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)
(internal quotations omitted).
84
Id.
85
S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 5 (1991).
86
Defendants’ Cross-Motion, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. 3:12cv-04947, 2012 WL 6020639, at *1, II(B) (quoting Delaware River Basin Comm’n v.
Bucks Cnty. Water & Sewer Auth., 641 F.2d 1087, 1098 (3d Cir. 1981)).
87
See Defendants’ Cross-Motion at II(B) (“[N]o principled basis would exist to
deny Congress the right to similarly limit car manufacturing to Michigan, cigarette
manufacturing to Virginia, or fish processing to Alaska.”).
88
Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce
Power, 91 Va. L. Rev. 249, 324 n.267 (2005).
82
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C. Due Process and Equal Protection
Finally, New Jersey argues that while the Supreme Court has
declined to acknowledge the Uniformity Requirement, the Court still
recognizes that the claimed discrimination may be “of such an
injurious character as to bring into operation the due process clause
89
of the Fifth Amendment.” PASPA is not a “facially neutral” statute,
as the exemptions contained within explicitly contemplate the states
90
to which they apply. As New Jersey argues, what Congress did with
PASPA was identify an issue that it sought to remedy, and then ban
the problem behavior solely in the places where it was already
91
illegal. Such a ban denies New Jersey a substantial amount of
revenue while four other states enjoy a federally-sanctioned
92
monopoly. Further, such discrimination by the federal government
is only permissible “where the ‘statute’s disparate geographic
93
coverage is sufficiently related to the problem it targets.’” The claim
here is that the geographic coverage of PASPA is essentially inversely
related to the problem it targets by banning sports betting exclusively
in jurisdictions where bans already exist.
The state claims that there is not even a rational basis for
believing that the passage of a law permitting sports gambling in New
Jersey was not injurious to the public interest in 1992, but had
94
become so in 2012. Rational basis review is a form of scrutiny used
by the Supreme Court to assess the validity of commercial legislation
95
that unfairly discriminates amongst groups of people. Although this
is the most deferential form of scrutiny undertaken by the Supreme
Court, it is still a standard that must be met by challenged legislation.

89

Defendants’ Cross-Motion at II(C) (quoting Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14
(1939)).
90
138 Cong. Rec. H11,756-02 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. William
Hughes).
91
Defendants’ Cross-Motion at II(C).
92
Id.
93
Id. (quoting Northwest Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S.
193, 203 (2009)).
94
Id.
95
U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
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POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PASPA

A. Gambling Laws in the United States Have Consistently Evolved
from Outright Prohibition to Close and Careful Regulation
Gambling has existed in various forms since the dawn of human
history, as people have consistently sought out activities that involve
96
risks and rewards. Yet throughout most, if not all, of the history of
the United States there have existed large and passionate movements
97
to eliminate it from society. As a result, laws and regulations
concerning gambling in its multitude of forms have evolved
continuously over the past four hundred years at the local, state, and
98
national levels. Prior to 1978, Nevada was the only state in which
99
casino gaming legally took place. As of this writing, legal casino
100
gaming exists in thirty-eight of the fifty states. In the 1840s and
1850s, a large number of states banned lotteries that had existed for
101
any number of years. Even the United States Supreme Court
weighed in, referring to lotteries as “element[s] that will be
102
confessedly injurious to the public morals.” Eventually, lotteries
ceased to exist in the United States until they were revived when New
103
Hampshire created a biannual lottery in 1963. As of this writing,
forty three states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands all operate and regulate their own lotteries in at least
104
one form.
While casino gaming and lotteries have gained prominence and
96

DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, ROLL THE BONES: THE HISTORY OF GAMBLING 5-6 (2006).
Id. at 140-157.
98
U.S.
Gambling
Timeline,
CAPE
COD
TIMES,
http://www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070724/CASINO/7
07240303 (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
99
SCHWARTZ, supra note 97, at 427-28.
100
AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, 2011 AGA SURVEY OF CASINO ENTERTAINMENT 4
(2011),
available
at
http://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/sos/aga-sos2011.pdf.
101
SCHWARTZ, supra note 97, at 150.
102
Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 357 (1903).
103
SCHWARTZ, supra note 97 at 387.
104
Lottery
Results,
UNITED
STATES
GOVERNMENT,
http://www.usa.gov/Topics/Lottery-Results.shtml (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
97
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legal legitimacy in recent decades, PASPA moved the regulation of
sports wagering in the opposite direction. As described above, each
form of gambling was at one time similarly situated to the others—
ruled illegal by many states but available to the public in certain
others. Then in 1992, before the vast majority of states had the
opportunity to explore the sports wagering environment, PASPA
105
eliminated the practice nationwide. As noted by Senator Chuck
Grassley during the debate over PASPA, the federal ban on sports
wagering is essentially the only time that the federal government has
106
involved itself in the direct regulation of gambling activities.
Notwithstanding the historical veracity of Grassley’s statement in
2013, with the exception of the regulation of gambling on Native
American lands, the regulation of lotteries, casinos, and racetracks is
presently carried out on a state-by-state basis, rather than by the
107
federal government. Independent of the question of whether a
unique federal ban such as PASPA violates the Tenth Amendment or
another tenet of the Constitution, it is counterintuitive that
governmental treatment of sports betting has followed the reverse
trajectory of other forms of gambling activity.
B. Sports Betting, Like Narcotics and Alcohol, Becomes Far More
Lucrative When Illegal
Despite PASPA’s blanket prohibition on sports wagering, a 1999
study estimated that as much as $380 billion changed hands in that
108
year alone as a result of illegal sports betting. In contrast, customers
109
wagered $3.45 billion legally at Nevada sports books in 2012.
Although no estimate is completely accurate, if illegal sports wagering
outnumbers legal sports wagering activity in the United States by a
105

Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 3701-3704
(West 1992).
106
S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 12 (1992).
107
AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, 2012 AGA SURVEY OF CASINO ENTERTAINMENT
11-22
(2012)
available
at
http://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/sos/aga_sos_20
12_web.pdf.
108
AMERICAN
GAMING
ASSOCIATION,
Sports
Wagering
Fact
Sheet,
http://www.americangaming.org/industry-resources/research/fact-sheets/sportswagering (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
109
Id.
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factor of over one hundred ten to one, it would appear that PASPA
has failed. This situation represents an example of an attempt to
legislate a certain “immoral” behavior in the United States falling well
short of its intended result of eliminating that behavior. During
Prohibition, incredible amounts of money could be made dealing in
illegal liquor. Since the mid-1960s, the “War on Drugs” has only
served to make narcotics trafficking more lucrative. And PASPA,
despite what the major sports leagues would have the public believe,
actually makes it easier to question the integrity of athletic contests by
de-regulating sports wagering activity and creating opportunities for
organized crime to flourish.
There are numerous examples of violence that emerges from
the organized crime domination of illegal gambling of all kinds.
When New York City closed its Off Track Betting parlors in
December of 2010, crime syndicates across the five boroughs gladly
110
stepped in to handle the action. In and around South Philadelphia
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, small-time bookmakers often
outperformed mob-connected bookies to the point where the Scarfo
111
crime family attempted to put a stop to their businesses, by force.
Crews of thugs employed by the syndicate broke into the home of
one bookie, duct-taping him to a chair and striking him with a pistol
112
repeatedly to “encourage” payment of protection money. As the
dominant force in “underground” activities in the area, the
Philadelphia mob would not stand for others crowding out their
business, and since their targets were not likely to go to the police,
113
their options were expansive. At the other end of the spectrum, one
well-known bookie in the area earned the nickname “The Gentleman
Gambler” because it was so out of the ordinary for someone in his
position to not engage in physical coercion to ensure repayment of

110

Larry McShane, Mob on track to win: With OTB gone, bookies are riding high with
Belmont Stakes on the horizon, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 5, 2011, available at
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/mob-track-win-otb-bookies-riding-highbelmont-stakes-horizon-article-1.128694.
111
SEAN PATRICK GRIFFIN, GAMING THE GAME 42-43 (2011).
112
Id. at 52.
113
Id.
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114

debts. In Chicago, organized crime factions make more money
115
from bookmaking operations than from any other source. So
profitable is this business that they will stop at nothing to prevent
anyone from stealing even miniscule profits from them. For example,
in one instance, an organized crime faction resorted to blowing up a
116
competitor’s van with the competitor inside. PASPA, by keeping the
world of sports betting in the shadows, enables bookies to essentially
torture clients into paying back debts, and encourages violent
intimidation tactics between competitors attempting to monopolize
the trade in a given geographic area.
The organized crime that thrives as a result of PASPA is the
modern relative of early twentieth century bootleggers. From 1920
until 1933, the sale, manufacture, and transportation of alcohol were
117
forbidden in the United States. Rather than eliminating the
consumption of alcohol as intended, Prohibition created an
underground market for alcohol, a supply vacuum into which a
118
number of sophisticated criminal enterprises gladly stepped. Al
Capone, arguably the most famous criminal in U.S. history, gained
every ounce of his fame and fortune by flouting the law brazenly and
119
openly. Eventually, the situation became so untenable and the ban
so impractical that the Twenty-First Amendment repealed Prohibition
120
on December 5, 1933. At this point a small number of bootleggers
continued in the industry, but a majority left the liquor business
121
altogether. In fact, one of the most popular— and profitable—
pursuits of the criminal underworld following Prohibition was the
122
gambling racket.
In the second half of the twentieth century, a new form of
114

Id. at 45.
Crime Inc.: The Big Business of Illegal Gambling (CNBC television broadcast Dec.
10, 2009), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/34039744.
116
Id.
117
STEPHEN FOX, BLOOD AND POWER 15-18 (1989).
118
Id.
119
Id. at 44-46.
120
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
121
FOX, supra note 118, at 52-60.
122
Id. at 98-104.
115
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Prohibition exists against a different caliber of illicit substances. Since
approximately July 1969, the United States government has engaged
in a large-scale campaign to eliminate the drug trade both within the
123
United States and abroad. Despite billions of dollars spent on this
elusive goal throughout the ensuing four-plus decades, statistics point
124
to these efforts being for naught. The “War on Drugs” has had an
effect similar to Prohibition in enhancing the monetary incentive for
groups of individuals to get into the business of providing illegal
125
goods.
The business has become so lucrative as a result of
draconian enforcement efforts that groups bearing little to no
resemblance to the traditional mafia have entered the equation and
earned themselves a substantial profit while perpetrating horrific acts
126
of violence to maintain— and expand— their market share.
C. Game-Fixing and Point-Shaving Have Created Huge Scandals
In Multiple Sports
In spite of the historical evidence that prohibiting activities only
makes them more profitable and by extension less honest, the
plaintiffs in NCAA v. Christie insisted that legal sports wagering would
127
harm the integrity of the games they facilitate. It would appear that
they have a perfect example of their theory in Tim Donaghy.
Donaghy was a National Basketball Association (“NBA”) referee who
bet on NBA games, including games to which he was personally
assigned, and additionally provided inside information about games
128
to friends who subsequently placed their own bets. Donaghy pled
guilty to two federal conspiracy counts, and he received a sentence of
123

Timeline:
America’s
War
on
Drugs,
NPR,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9252490 (last visited Oct. 2,
2012).
124
See Eduardo Porter, Numbers Tell of Failure in Drug War, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 4, 2012,
at B1.
125
FOX, supra note 118, at 362-66.
126
Id. at 411-20.
127
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Christie, No. CV124947, 2012 WL 3171566, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2012).
128
Alan Schwartz & William K. Rashbaum, N.B.A. Referee Is the Focus of a Federal
Inquiry,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jul.
21,
2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/21/sports/basketball/21referee.html?_r=2&ref=
sports&oref=slogin.
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129

fifteen months in prison. The plaintiffs argued that legalizing sports
130
gambling will create more Tim Donaghys. On the other hand, if
sports wagering were legal and completely transparent, it would be
far easier to monitor and regulate it, forcing any potential Donaghy
copycats out of the shadows and drastically reducing the danger of
131
certain groups of people placing bets on games.
Further, the most famous “point-shaving” scandals in U.S. history
have involved college players— individuals who would require a lower
132
monetary incentive to become involved in illicit activity. Point
shaving involves conduct by players (or officials) during a game that
does not affect the outcome, but alters the margin of victory so that
133
the losing team “covers the spread.” The two most notorious point
shaving scandals in U.S. history involved the 1950-51 City College of
New York (“CCNY”) basketball team and the 1978-79 Boston College
134
basketball team. Although it is logical to presume that unpaid
collegiate athletes are more susceptible to the pressures potentially
exerted by individuals looking to control the outcome of games, it is
important to view these scandals in the proper context. Both the
135
136
CCNY and the Boston College scandals involved local, small-time
gangsters with personal connections to the players in question. In a
world where wagering on sports was and is illegal in the jurisdiction
in which these men resided, the point-shaving schemes they operated
were an easy way to make a quick buck without any corporate
competition.
In February 2013, as NCAA v. Christie awaited a decision by Judge
129

Donaghy Sentenced to 15 Months in Prison in Gambling Scandal, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Jul. 30, 2008), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=3509440.
130
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Christie, No. CV124947, 2012 WL 3171566, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2012).
131
E.g. professional athletes (Alex Karras), coaches (Pete Rose) and referees
(Donaghy).
132
Jason Goldstein, Note, Take the Money Line: PASPA, Bureaucratic Politics, and the
Integrity of the Game, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 362, 371-72 (2012).
133
See SCHWARTZ supra note 99, at 372-73.
134
See Goldstein, supra note 133, at 371-72.
135
See Joe Goldstein, Explosion: 1951 Scandals Threaten College Hoops, ESPN (Nov.
19, 2003), http://espn.go.com/classic/s/basketball_scandals_explosion.html.
136
United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 73-75 (2d Cir. 1983).
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Shipp on the motions for summary judgment, match-fixing in
137
international soccer suddenly grabbed global headlines. Criminal
syndicates throughout Asia allegedly influenced the outcome of 680
matches in the years from 2009-2012, including matches as
138
prominent as the group stage of the UEFA Champions League.
That the world’s most popular sport, and more specifically that
sport’s most popular annual competition, could be infiltrated in such
a way is a major story. For the purposes of this Note, the most
important factor is that the groups fixing these matches are also
betting on them legally, seemingly undercutting arguments that legal
139
betting reduces the risk of match-fixing. These criminals place their
bets in legitimate sports books, mostly located in Manila, which
eschew regulation in favor of volume, allowing for the kinds of profits
140
that make match-fixing a worthwhile risk.
D. Open and Well-Regulated Gambling Would Have Inhibited
Historic “Fixing” Scandals
In the case of Tim Donaghy, there is no guarantee that he would
have been prevented from betting on games that he officiated had
legal gambling existed, but the likelihood that he would have gotten
away with it for so long is greatly diminished. The overwhelming
majority of sports wagering that occurs in the United States today is

137

Outside the Lines: Global Soccer Match-Fixing Scandal (ESPN television broadcast
Feb.
8,
2013),
available
at
http://soccernet.espn.go.com/video/espnfc/video?id=1332501&cc=5901.
138
Id. The UEFA Champions League is a competition featuring the prior year’s
champions (and second and third place squads, depending on country) from
domestic leagues across Europe. Each of the thirty-two teams plays a home and away
series against the other three teams in its “group” and the top two in each group
advance to a sixteen team bracket featuring similar home and away matches where
the scores are aggregated to determine who advances. Given the annual presence in
the competition of the wealthiest and most popular clubs in the world, this
competition receives an inordinate amount of attention from all corners of the
globe.
139
Brett Forrest, All the World is Staged, ESPN THE MAGAZINE, May 28, 2012,
available at http://espn.go.com/sports/soccer/story/_/id/7927946/soccer-wilsonraj-perumal-world-most-prolific-criminal-match-fixer-espn-magazine.
140
Brett Forrest, Surprised by the match-fixing scandal? You shouldn’t be, ESPN FC
(Feb.
8,
2013,
9:23
AM),
UNITED
http://soccernet.espn.go.com/blog/_/name/espnfcunited/id/3254?cc=5901.
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141

under the table. PASPA’s ban on sports wagering creates a serious
monetary incentive for individuals or groups to facilitate illicit
gambling by members of the general public, as the demand remains
as high as ever and the risk creates premium prices for the service.
Furthermore, this world of neighborhood bookies and cash
142
transactions is incredibly difficult for law enforcement to track.
Conversely, wagering done at Las Vegas sports books, casinos, and
143
racetracks is subject to an incredible amount of scrutiny. Large wins
always garner some kind of inquiry into their legitimacy, even when
144
accomplished by someone who is expected to win. Las Vegas sports books
are also reluctant to accept inordinately large wagers, and are known
to lower their limits and engage every ounce of their surveillance
145
might on those who place wagers of even four figures. Concededly,
Michael Konik’s account of his time “running money” for a big time
gambler shows exactly how individuals with enough resources can get
around these limitations. Yet Konik’s story also makes clear just how
quickly suspicion fell on him simply because of the amount of money
he wagered at a given time, despite the fact that he was employed
146
specifically to reduce suspicion. The suspicion Konik received rose
and fell proportionally with his successes and failures, which hovered
141

NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N REPORT 2-14 (1999), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/finrpt.html.
142
SEAN PATRICK GRIFFIN, GAMING THE GAME xxv, xxvi (2011). In fact, the FBI
only caught on to Donaghy after a probe of the Gambino crime family directed them
to professional gambler Jimmy Battista, a high school classmate of Donaghy’s and
one of the men to whom Donaghy passed information.
143
See generally MICHAEL KONIK, THE SMART MONEY (2006) (detailing a multi-year
association between gambling journalist Konik and a consortium of big-money
gamblers who used men like Konik to place their bets because of the casino’s
reticence to accept certain high-volume players’ money).
144
Poker star Phil Ivey wins $11.5 million, but casino refuses to pay, L.A. TIMES (Oct.
10,
2012),
http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-phil-ivey-londoncasino-refuses-to-pay-20121010,0,6445151.story. Phil Ivey is likely the most famous
poker professional in the world today and the most successful player of the 21st
Century, but wins in certain large amounts are still subject to intense scrutiny in the
highly-regulated betting parlors of Las Vegas and the United Kingdom.
145
See KONIK, supra note 144 at 28, 29. It is worth noting that Michael Konik had
no connections to game-fixing or point shaving, could not have won more than 60
percent of his bets overall, and often had several exceptionally poor runs at picking
games, yet the casinos still took considerable steps to curtail his behavior.
146
KONIK, supra note144 at 29.
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147

around fifty-five percent. While it is completely accurate to say that
game fixing still could exist in a world with widespread legal sports
betting, these examples— and others below— show that legalization,
regulation, and scrutiny make that risk exceedingly minimal.
Also instructive to consider is the personality of today’s big-time
legal gambler. The individuals who engage in the high-stakes
wagering that Las Vegas casinos fear are supremely competitive, but
148
they are not the type of people that attempt to win at all costs.
Rather, these individuals want to win as a result of being the best at
what they do and by being smarter than everyone else, motivations
149
that carry a certain amount of inherent integrity. The big time legal
sports bettor sees himself as no different from a hedge fund
manager— which may not be the best argument for integrity—
attempting to predict which sides will make the most money and
trusting that research, skill, and exploiting market inefficiency result
150
in winnings that exceed losses.
Another important consideration is the difficulty of fixing a
game or shaving points in today’s high-compensation— and
information-saturated— sporting environment. The most famous
game-fixing scandal of all time involved the 1919 Chicago White Sox
151
“throwing” the World Series against the Cincinnati Reds. Gangster
Arnold Rothstein paid eight members of the White Sox $10,000 each
152
to allow the Reds to win. Despite being the far superior team based
upon both talent and that season’s performance, the White Sox fell
153
to the Reds five games to three. The two best players on the White
147

See KONIK, supra note 144. Given the “vig” charged by sports books to ensure
that they remain profitable, an individual needs to win 55 percent of the time to
break even.
148
But c.f. id. with 60 Minutes: Sports Betting: Billy Walters (CBS television broadcast
Jan. 16, 2011) (available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7253011n).
Although Michael Konik changed the names of the individuals portrayed in his
book, it is widely believed that Billy Walters is the real-life identity of “Big Daddy Rick
Matthews”, the main character in Konik’s memoir.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
SCHWARTZ, supra note 97, at 339.
152
Id.
153
Id.
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Sox, Ed Cicotte and Joe Jackson, who were both involved in the
154
scandal, each made $6,000 per year. By involving themselves in
Rothstein’s plot, the two best players on the team— individuals who
are arguably essential if one wants to be certain of influencing the
outcome of a best-of-nine series— nearly doubled their yearly
155
salaries. In contrast, the eight lowest-paid players on the 2012 World
Series champion San Francisco Giants each made between $480,000
156
and $483,000. Legal sports books are loath to permit wagers higher
157
than $55,000 on a single professional game. As this $55,000 limit
would only net a profit of $50,000 if successful, and such limits are
often merely academic and are lowered dramatically once someone
dares to approach them, it would simply not be cost-effective for
gamblers to pay eight U.S. professional athletes— especially the
higher-compensated and higher-profile players necessary to a
successful fix— a sufficient amount of money to induce them to
throw away the opportunity of winning a championship.
As far as college athletics are concerned, the Boston College and
CCNY situations are easily contrasted with the experience of the
University of Nevada-Las Vegas (“UNLV”) basketball program.
Although constantly under investigation by the NCAA for violations—
real and alleged— of rules governing recruiting and the amateur
status of student-athletes, and once the subject of a federal probe

154

Paul D. Stoudohar, Baseball’s Changing Salary Structure, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS (Fall 1997).Compensation and Working Conditions Fall 1997 at 3,
available
at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/baseballs-changing-salarystructure.pdf.
155
The World Series operated under a best-of-nine format at that time, but is
currently best-of-seven.
156
San
Francisco
Giants
Salary/Payroll
Information-2012,
ESPN,
http://espn.go.com/mlb/team/salaries/_/name/sf/san-francisco-giants
(last
visited Month XX, 201X).
157
See KONIK, supra note 144, at 22, 23. This figure was simply Konik’s experience
with two major Las Vegas sports books, and almost exclusive wagering on
professional football. If sports wagering were legal in New Jersey, a state where four
professional teams play— and eleven more play within 30 miles of its borders— it is
reasonable to believe that scrutiny would be even higher and limits even lower,
especially for sports where individual players have more influence, such as basketball,
or directly determine whether the opposing team scores, such as soccer and ice
hockey.
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regarding connections to a known game-fixer, UNLV has never been
connected by concrete evidence to gambling activity or point
158
shaving. This example should show how legal and highly regulated
sports wagering eliminates the market for nefarious individuals who
possess the proclivity to alter the outcome of games to stay in
business.
The mere fact that UNLV is permitted to compete in
intercollegiate athletics underscores the hypocrisy of the NCAA in
signing on to the lawsuit against New Jersey. The NCAA does
maintain a policy preventing states, where single-game betting is
legal, from hosting any part of a national championship, but any
injury that the organization claims in the instant lawsuit is fallacious
in light of the continued existence of the UNLV athletic program.
Moreover, the NCAA has permitted repeated iterations of the
Mountain West Conference Men’s Basketball Tournament and 21
(and counting) annual “Las Vegas Bowls” to take place in Las
159
Vegas.
The existence of these long-standing events, plus the
addition of the 2013 and 2014 Pacific-12 Conference Men’s
Basketball Tournaments in the heart of Sin City completely
160
contradict the arguments made in the instant lawsuit. If the NCAA
would suffer a concrete and particularized injury in New Jersey, how
has it not suffered such injury to this point in Nevada?
The international soccer scandal is slightly more vexing in light
of the fact that the criminal syndicates engaging in match-fixing place
their bets legally. But the atmosphere in which these bets are placed
is a far cry from the pervasive regulatory scheme that undoubtedly
would be a part of legalized sports betting in New Jersey. This chaotic
culture allows individuals to place massive wagers, as well as fix and
bet on matches in the third or fourth division of obscure nations not

158

Greg Garber & Kory Kozak, Twenty years later, UNLV still indignant, ESPN (Apr.
1,
2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/tournament/2010/columns/story?id=5045144.
159
Bowl Facts, LAS VEGAS BOWL, http://www.lvbowl.com/facts.php.
160
See Chris Dufresne, Conference tournaments take their chances in Las Vegas, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/12/sports/la-sp-0313pac-12-basketball-gambling-20130313.
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known for footballing prowess, all without arousing much
161
suspicion. The obscurity of the vast majority of the supposedly fixed
matches is the perfect cover, but would be unavailable to gamblers
within the United States. Primarily, although soccer’s popularity has
been on the rise in the United States for decades, it is likely that
wagering options on the sport would be seriously limited. As Michael
Konik’s experiences again exemplify, both the most popular— i.e.,
Super Bowl— and least popular— soccer, tennis, small-time college
football— events have lower betting limits and are subject to more
162
scrutiny before a single wager is placed. If an individual walked into
the hypothetical future sports book at Monmouth Park Raceway and
attempted to wager even $5,000 on a USL PRO— the third division of
professional soccer in the United States— match between the
Rochester Rhinos and the Harrisburg City Islanders, there would be
an immediate inquiry and any foul play would most certainly be
uncovered.
V.

CONGRESS SHOULD REPEAL PASPA OR REVISE THE BAN TO
ALLOW NEW JERSEY TO MOVE FORWARD

A. New Jersey’s Constitutional Challenges— Already Denied
Once— Do Not Appear Destined For Success
On February 28, 2013, Judge Michael Shipp granted the
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, enjoining implementation
163
of New Jersey’s proposed sports betting regulations. Judge Shipp
reasoned that PASPA is an appropriate use of the Commerce Power,
that it does not force New Jersey to act in a certain way, and that
164
Congress had a rational basis to enact PASPA in the way that it did.
On September 17, 2013, a panel of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed Judge Shipp’s grant of summary judgment to the

161

See Forrest, supra note 141.
KONIK, supra note 144.
163
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551,
(D.N.J. 2013) aff'd sub nom. NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir.
2013).
164
Id. at *2.
162
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165

sports league plaintiffs by a vote of 2-1.

Regarding New Jersey’s Commerce Clause arguments, the state
puts itself at a disadvantage by relying on an argument that does not
166
appear to have been accepted by the Supreme Court since 1923.
However, if New Jersey’s interpretation of the uniformity concept is
accurate, and the idea is merely dormant rather than explicitly
rejected, one would think that they could have a few sympathetic ears
on the Supreme Court. The argument for a uniformity requirement
167
is one rooted in an analysis of the Framers’ intent. Thus, even
someone with a perfunctory understanding of the Court’s current
composition could make the educated guess that there are at least a
few justices who would be open to any legal theories—grounded in
legitimate precedent, of course—that would limit Congress’ power
under the Commerce Clause. Although scholars proposing to revisit
the uniformity principle concede that such an interpretation is not
wholly consistent with Justice Scalia’s brand of originalism, it is not
outlandish to think that these arguments would get the attention of
168
Justice Scalia and others.
As economic legislation, a review of PASPA on equal protection
169
grounds would likely be rational basis review. Yet as New Jersey’s
brief reminds us, “[t]hough the rational basis test is deferential, it ‘is
170
not a toothless one.’” In fact, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme
Court asserted that it has “never held that moral disapproval, without
any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the
Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among
171
groups of persons.” The stated purpose of PASPA is to curtail sports
betting in this country because such behavior “threatens to change
165

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
167
Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce
Power, 91 VA. L. REV. 249, 263-88 (2005).
168
Id. at 302-08.
169
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
170
Defendants’ Cross-Motion, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. 3:12cv-04947, 2012 WL 6020639, at *1 II(C) (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2012) (quoting Matthews v.
DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976)).
171
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538, 582 (2003).
166
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the nature of sporting events from wholesome entertainment for all
172
ages to devices for gambling.” The Senate report makes clear that
there is a heavy dose of morality behind the push to ban sports
173
betting. Congress’ desire to cure what it believed to be a moral evil
may not, under established precedent, justify discriminating against
the state of New Jersey in its desire to raise revenue, while permitting
the very same activity to go on unfettered in Nevada.
Although the “equal footing” arguments put forth by New Jersey
have not gained traction, the Tenth Amendment arguments have not
fallen on deaf ears. Although these arguments were not successful on
appeal, Judge Thomas Vanaskie wrote a dissenting opinion in which
he posited that PASPA is unconstitutional because it impermissibly
commandeers the New Jersey state government for federal
174
purposes. The text of PASPA’s prohibition can be interpreted as
telling state legislatures how to legislate, but the plain meaning of the
statute is more suggestive of an outright prohibition of a specific
175
activity. Judge Vanaskie points out that all other forms of gambling
activity are presently— and for most of history have been— regulated
by individual states, which would mean that the federal government
176
has intruded on an area traditionally reserved for the states.
Because other forms of gambling are governed by state law, the
177
average person is likely to believe that sports betting is so governed.
Thus, if citizens possess a strong desire for legal sports betting— and
the 2011 referendum says that they do— it stands to reason that they
would take out their frustrations on state legislators who are
“denying” them such an opportunity. This would insulate federal
legislators from the consequences of passing an unpopular law, which
is the essence of the Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering
178
jurisprudence. New Jersey would have a stronger argument if

172
173
174
175
176
177
178

S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1991).
Id.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 730 F.3d at 241.
28 U.S.C.A. 3702 (West 1992).
NCAA v. Christie, 730 F.3d at 241 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting).
Id. at 246.
Id.
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PASPA required state and local authorities to enforce its terms,
180
rather than the FBI, but Judge Vanaskie’s point is well taken.
Moreover, as Judge Vanaskie writes, the language of PASPA
specifically prohibits states from licensing sports betting operations,
181
rather than simply prohibiting sports betting. PAPSA’s directive to
refrain from acting is no different from requiring states to act in a
certain way, which was ruled unconstitutional in New York and
182
Printz. There is no federal regulatory scheme governing sports
betting that preempts state regulation, but instead PASPA “set federal
183
parameters as to how states may regulate sports gambling.”
B. How New Jersey Stands To Gain
Although New Jersey faces an uphill battle in its attempt to
declare PASPA unconstitutional, the arguments are there. Judge
Vanaskie feels that PASPA impermissibly commandeers state
apparatus to fulfill the will of Congress, and with the possibility that
other states will follow New Jersey’s example, the Supreme Court may
want to consider this issue. Yet, regardless of the constitutionality of
PAPSA, Congress should utilize PASPA’s newfound publicity to
examine just how practical and necessary the ban actually is. The
history of laws governing other forms of gambling, as well as the
prohibition of alcohol and the “War on Drugs” have shown that
permission in conjunction with close regulation destroys the
incentives for illegal activity.
If one divides the $388 billion estimate— the amount of money
believed to be wagered illegally each year— by forty-six— the number
of states where sports wagering is presently illegal— it can be
estimated that New Jersey sports books would see approximately $8.4
184
billion wagered annually. It is unlikely that such a figure is wholly

179

See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
See generally SEAN PATRICK GRIFFIN, GAMING THE GAME (2011) (detailing the FBI
investigation that resulted in the conviction of Tim Donaghy).
181
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 730 F.3d at 245(Vanaskie, J.,
dissenting).
182
Id.
183
Id. at 249.
184
Sports
Wagering
Fact
Sheet,
AMERICAN
GAMING
ASSOCIATION,
180
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accurate, given that it represents a 300 percent increase over what is
annually wagered in Las Vegas, but it is the best estimate that can be
185
made from data that presently exists.
Further, New Jersey’s
proximity to New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington,
D.C., and Boston does provide a much larger pool of avid sports fans
and potential bettors than the population centers within a similar
radius of Las Vegas. If it is an accurate estimate, one can expect gross
revenue for New Jersey sports books to be around $412.3 million
annually, based on the fact that Nevada sports books generate
186
revenue at around 4.9 percent of the total amount wagered. New
Jersey’s current tax rate on “gross gaming revenue”— the amount a
casino earns as revenue after paying guest winnings— is 8 percent,
with an additional option of a 1.25 percent community investment
187
alternative or a 2.5 percent investment alternative. The original
sports wagering bill states that sports wagering revenues will be
subject to both the 8 percent tax and the 1.25 percent community
188
investment alternative. Nine and one-fourth percent of $412.3
million yields estimated annual tax revenue for the state of New
Jersey of $38.1 million. This figure would represent a 13.7 percent
189
increase over 2011 New Jersey tax revenues from gaming. These
numbers take on added importance in light of the fact that state
income from casino taxes in New Jersey dropped by 9.6 percent in
190
fiscal year 2011 compared to fiscal year 2010.
Further, the
regulations published by the state as of October 15, 2012, would
http://www.americangaming.org/industry-resources/research/fact-sheets/sportswagering (last visited October 1, 2012).
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, 2012 AGA SURVEY OF CASINO ENTERTAINMENT,
19
(2012),
available
at
http://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/sos/aga_sos_20
12_web.pdf.
188
A.B. 4385, 214th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. Nov. 28, 2011) (Statement).
189
See AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, 2012 AGA SURVEY OF CASINO
ENTERTAINMENT
19
(2012)
available
at
http://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/sos/aga_sos_20
12_web.pdf. New Jersey’s 2012 “Gaming Tax Revenue” was $277.60 million, down
from $305.50 million in 2011.
190
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES, 2012 REVENUE SNAPSHOT 2 (2012), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/budget/FY12_Year_End_Final.pdf.

NOTE_MIERSWA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

478

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

6/25/2014 10:43 AM

[Vol. 38:2

require locations that apply for licenses to pay a $50,000 registration
fee, as well as a continued “resubmission fee” of $50,000 every five
191
years.
As there are twelve casinos in Atlantic City and four
racetracks that are eligible for licenses, New Jersey stands to gain up
to $800,000 in these fees in 2014, 2019, 2024, and beyond, with a
certain percentage of that money going towards compulsive gambling
192
treatment and prevention programs. As small as these numbers
193
appear in the context of New Jersey’s 2012 budget of $31.7 billion,
it would help to close the 6.8 percent gap between New Jersey’s 2011
194
and 2012 budgets. Legal sports betting in New Jersey will provide a
significant economic benefit to the state, a major reason why
Governor Christie is such a staunch supporter of the measure.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Given recent developments in potentially expanding the legality
of internet gaming, Congress would be well-served by examining the
inconsistency of gambling regulation in this country. Whether it is reopening the grace period to allow New Jersey to pass appropriate
legislation, or opening the possibility of legal sports betting in all 50
states, any move to cut back on PASPA’s prohibition would allow for
an increase in revenue for the affected states with minimal downside
if enacted appropriately. The potential developments in this saga
should have Federalism scholars— not to mention sports fans and
wise guys across New Jersey— paying rapt attention for years to come.

191

Donald Wittkowski, Final regulation approved for sports betting in New Jersey, THE
PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, Oct. 16, 2012
192
Id.
193
Kate Zernike, Christie Signs Budget, but Also Vetoes Pieces, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 30,
2012 at A18.
194
Id.

